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Abstract Intelligence gathering plays a vital role in the ‘war’ against money
laundering. Particularly important in this intelligence gathering process is the global
network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) fed by a host of auxiliary (primarily
financial) institutions required to report suspicious transactions. This paper briefly
reviews the history of the international system of anti-money laundering measures
imposed on the financial industry and other regulated businesses, the development of
the global network of FIUs and their system of information gathering. It will examine
some of the issues that arise from the regulatory framework within which this
information gathering takes place. It will also address the issue of instrumental clarity
and whether existing and new directives, requirements and approaches are sufficiently
clear to enable reporting institutions on the ‘front-line’ to operate effectively.
Introduction
Intelligence gathering has played a paramount role in every war. The ‘war’ against
money laundering has been no exception. It started about twenty years ago as an
extension of the battleground for the war on drugs; and in the aftermath of 11
September 2001 it became fused with the new war on terrorism of which the fight
against the financing of terrorism has become an integral part. With the increasing
importance of intelligence in this war, the scope for financial intelligence gathering
has grown commensurately. Legislative developments in this field have, therefore,
risen to unprecedented levels of information collection, allocation and dissemination.
Particularly critical in the arsenal of governments internationally has been the global
network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)1 fed by a host of auxiliary (primarily
financial) institutions required to report suspicious transactions. How has the
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financial intelligence concept unfolded and been cast into regulations, and how have
the facilitators of intelligence (the reporting institutions, i.e. financial and other
institutions that are required to report suspicious transactions to the respective FIUs)
responded to the new challenges brought about by these trends?
This paper briefly reviews the history of the international system of anti-money
laundering measures imposed on the financial industry and other regulated
businesses, the development of the global network of FIUs and their system of
information gathering. It will examine some of the issues that arise from the
regulatory framework within which this information gathering takes place. It will
also address the issue of instrumental clarity and whether existing and new
directives, requirements and approaches are sufficiently clear to enable reporting
institutions on the ‘front-line’ to operate effectively.
The emergence of a new battleground
According to a number of authors (see [23, 33]), money laundering is not a modern
phenomenon. Money laundering techniques were applied over 2000 years ago by the
ancient Chinese merchants, who used various means, including purchasing movable
assets and sending money abroad, to protect their wealth from the government (see
[29]); by the moneylenders in the Middle Ages who invented various mechanisms to
cover up their evasion of laws which criminalised usury [33]; by the pirates of the
Mediterranean who deprived Rome of its supplies and concealed their loot but were
eventually defeated by Pompey in 67 BC and the pirates who targeted European
commercial vessels during the 16th–18th centuries and became “pioneers in the
practice of laundering gold” ([33] p. 1).2 Concealing one’s wealth for tax evasion
purposes is also an old phenomenon. Secret banking in Switzerland, for instance,
dates back to at least the time of the French Revolution [27, 32]. However, even
though tax evasion and money laundering techniques existed, the concept of money
laundering, in terms of providing a legitimate appearance to ill-gotten gains, was yet
to materialise. It was not until the early years of the 20th century, when the US tax
authorities began to require proof of legal earnings, that the concept of money
laundering became particularly relevant [2, 19]. There was also the emergence of
‘organised crime’ on the political agenda during the 1920s (see for relevant
developments [19]). The fight against organised crime and the process of globalisation
of economic and regulatory policies after the First and Second World Wars prepared
the world for what became later a global war on money laundering. The war on
money laundering and the related concept of following the money trail and hitting the
criminals where it hurts most became a prelude to a global system of asset forfeiture.
The USA has undoubtedly been the main driving force behind the introduction of
anti-money laundering regulations worldwide and the establishment of FIUs. The
Financial Record-Keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Act
of 1970, known as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA),3 constituted the first comprehen-
sive American anti-money laundering law. The Act did not explicitly contain the
2 P. 1 of an online available pdf version
3 31 U.S.C.1051 et seq.
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term ‘money laundering’ and neither did subsequent regulations of 19724 and of
1977.5 However, the Act was introduced to target crime-money concealment and
laundering, and, in the main, tax evasion. It stipulated that financial institutions
maintain records and file reports so as to enable law enforcement authorities to track
financial transactions in criminal, fiscal or regulatory investigations.
The term ‘money laundering’ can be traced back to 1973 when it appeared in
print during the Watergate scandal [126, 18, 26]. The term was first used in a judicial
context in 1982 in the case US v $4, 255, 625.39 (1982) 551 F Supp 314, and it
subsequently spread worldwide [12].
The first US federal law to criminalize money laundering, the Money Laundering
Control Act, was introduced in 1986. However, during the 1980s money laundering
was still primarily associated with drug trafficking.7 Two years after the introduction
of the 1986 Act, on the eve of global economic liberalisation and just before the fall
of the Berlin Wall, the international community reached agreement on two
documents and these represented the first major steps towards international
cooperation in the fight against money laundering. The two agreements in question
were the UN Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention/19 December 1988) and the Basle
Statement of Principles on the Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System
for the Purpose of Money Laundering (December 1988).
The Basle Statement outlined several basic principles with regard to the banking
system, including the need for customer identification and cooperation with law
enforcement authorities. The Vienna Convention addressed the confiscation of assets
and the issue of bank secrecy, and envisaged, inter alia, mutual legal assistance
between Member States.
These agreements were hugely significant for the development of global anti-
money laundering policies. However, they were not sufficient. The next step was to
create an international forum that could be used to promote or, if necessary, impose
policies worldwide. The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)
became this forum.
The FATF was established in July 1989 in Paris during the fifteenth annual
Economic Summit of the G7, bringing together the US, Japan, Germany, France,
UK, Italy and Canada. The summit participants also invited Sweden, Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Australia to join the Task
Force. The FATF was created to help enhance international cooperation and assess
the results of anti-money laundering policies globally. According to a 1996 report of
the US General Accounting Office,8 “the United States’ multilateral efforts to
establish global anti-money-laundering policies occur mainly through FATF” [34].
The FATF also became instrumental in the efforts of the US to broadcast the ‘threat
4 Sec. 103.23 Reports of transportation of currency and monetary instruments
5 Sec. 103.24 Reports of foreign accounts
6 Gillmore [12] makes a reference to Vallance, [36].
7 The US Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 referred to proceeds from “specified unlawful activity”
which, in addition to drug proceeds also included inter alia the proceeds of extortion, fraud and bribery.
Nevertheless, for a number of years the focus remained largely on drug-related offences.
8 The US General Accounting Office was renamed US Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2004.
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image’ of organised crime (see [6], pp. 22–34). The FATF has directed the war on
financial crime and money laundering by acting as an informal vehicle for enforcing
US foreign policy in this field.
In 1990, the FATF issued a report describing the purported state of affairs
concerning drugs money, and laid down forty recommendations.9 The word
‘recommendations’, however, is misleading as these recommendations proved to be
no less imperative than treaty obligations. Using the procedure of evaluating countries
individually, the FATF turned its recommendations into an instrument of pressure:
evaluated countries were to be listed as ‘non-cooperative’ unless they adopted FATF
standards [7, 21, 24, 31]. In this way the FATF cemented the foundations of an
unprecedented global anti-money laundering control system. It enforced a strategy
that required financial institutions and other market players to become watchmen and
report suspicious or unusual activities to “the competent authorities”, i.e. to the
frontline regiment of FIUs. The FATF has endorsed the position of FIUs on the
frontline as the processor of intelligence and as a vehicle for intelligence dissem-
ination between the reporting institutions and law enforcement/ regulatory agencies.
The drive for intelligence gathering
New battlegrounds require new forms of intelligence gathering. Naturally, on the
money laundering front intelligence primarily concerns financial transactions and
money flows. This drive for financial intelligence and the need to streamline efforts in
information gathering and processing led to the establishment of the first FIUs. In
some jurisdictions (primarily world financial centres) appropriate units, forerunners of
the modern FIUs, were set up in the mid-to-late 1980s, at around the time of the
introduction of relevant national anti-drug trafficking regulations as well as the Vienna
Convention and the Basle Statement of Principles. For instance, the UK established
the National Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU) in 1985. The NDIU10 was assigned with
the task of collecting disclosures concerning drug-related suspicious transactions
from financial institutions and providing relevant intelligence to other investigative
agencies (see [25]). The Isle of Man Financial Crime Unit became operational in
1986, while the Cayman Islands’ Financial Reporting Authority (CAYFIN), and
Hong Kong’s Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU), both became operational in
1989. Guernsey’s FIU, the Financial Intelligence Service, was formed in 1989.
Australia founded its own FIU, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis
Centre (AUSTRAC), in 1989 in accordance with the Financial Transaction Reports
Act of 1988, and the unit began operating in January 1990. The American FIU, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), was established in April 1990.11
9 The FATF revised its recommendations in 1996 and 2003, and additionally issued nine special
recommendations on terrorist financing (eight in 2001, and one in 2004) as well as various “Interpretative
Notes” to reflect developments in money laundering practices and to provide further guidance.
10 For many years the UK’s FIU was the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), which was
formed out of the NDIU and set up as a separate body in 1992. In 2006 NCIS was merged into a newly
created agency, Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).
11 I am grateful to the Egmont Group Secretariat for assisting me in confirming these dates.
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Despite these early developments, the function of FIUs as central bodies
responsible for money laundering compliance was yet to be determined and
subsequently enforced and strengthened during the 1990s. FinCEN took the lead in
establishing a global network of FIUs.
FinCEN was established to provide the US government with intelligence from
multiple sources and the capabilities to analyse leads to help law enforcement agencies
and prosecutors detect, investigate and prosecute financial crimes. FinCEN’s duties
broadened in the years following its establishment: in May 1994 its mission was
expanded by the US Treasury to include regulatory responsibilities.12 FinCEN’s
extended responsibilities included the following: promulgating regulations under the
Bank Secrecy Act, evaluating BSA violations and recommending appropriate civil
penalties, and providing assistance in leading the Treasury’s efforts in fighting money
laundering both inside the country and internationally [35]. This effectively meant that
FinCEN was to take the lead role in expanding the intelligence drive outside the
jurisdiction of the US by promoting the creation of similar units abroad. FinCEN set
the example for the creation of a central national government facility that would not
only play a crucial role in the sharing of information among law enforcement agencies
and other regulatory partners, but would also gather and process intelligence from
private sector organisations obliged to report any suspicious activity to FinCEN.
The need to appoint authorities specifically responsible for combating money
laundering was highlighted by the 1990 Council of Europe Convention No 141 on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the
1991 EU Council Directive on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for
the Purpose of Money Laundering (91/308/EEC). Nevertheless, the establishment of
FIUs during the early 1990s was viewed as “isolated phenomena related to the
specific needs of those jurisdictions establishing them” (see [9], p. 3). It was not
until the mid-1990s that FIUs were recognised on a much larger scale as a crucial part
of anti-money laundering strategy. In 1995 several FIUs, including FinCEN, combined
their efforts to develop a global forum for promoting the establishment of FIUs across
the world. This forum, which became known as the Egmont Group, was founded as an
informal organisation in Brussels on 9 June 1995. In 1996 the Egmont Group adopted
a definition of FIU that was later incorporated in the revised FATF recommendations
of 2003 and other international documents. Egmont Group defined FIU as:
a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted,
requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclo-
sures of financial information:
(i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or
(ii) required by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money
laundering13 ([9], p. 2).
Indeed the establishment of the Egmont Group signified a crucial turning point in
the global fight against money laundering as it strengthened international
12 In October 1994 FinCEN was merged with the Treasury Department’s Office of Financial Enforcement
(OFE) which had previously administered the BSA (see http://www.fincen.gov/helpfin.html).
13 This definition was later expanded further to include terrorist financing.
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cooperation and helped create better mechanisms for the cross-border exchange of
information. This role of Egmont Group has been fostered by FinCEN in particular.
On its website FinCEN States14 that since 1995 “the U.S. has pursued an aggressive
policy of promoting a worldwide network of Financial Intelligence Units in its
overall strategy of fighting money laundering and terrorist financing.” However,
there were still setbacks to be overcome with regard to international intelligence
sharing.
Initial setbacks in intelligence sharing
As authorities officially designated to receive reports of suspicious transactions, the
FIUs have access to multiple sources of information that may help identify criminals
and money launderers (some of whom are one and the same person). By sharing
such information amongst themselves FIUs help fight money laundering on a global
scope. However, apart from the obvious human rights and data protection limitations
relating to such procedures, FIUs had at some point to address problems of
cooperation resulting from the differing legal statuses of different types of FIUs.
The Egmont Group [9] defines the following types of FIUs:
& the judicial type (or prosecutorial, as defined by the IMF [15]) exists within the
judicial branch of the state;
& the law enforcement type exists within the national law enforcement system;
& the administrative type is “a centralized, independent, administrative authority,
which receives and processes information from the financial sector and transmits
disclosures to judicial or law enforcement authorities for prosecution. It functions
as a ‘buffer’ between the financial and the law enforcement communities” ([9],
p. 3);
& the hybrid type combines elements of at least two FIU models (of those named
above) and functions as an intelligence processing and disseminating body for
the police and judicial authorities.
Each of these models has its advantages and disadvantages, but the main problem
arising from having different types of FIUs worldwide is the variation in their
competences. While a law enforcement type FIU may have broader or more
significant investigative powers, an administrative type FIU runs the risk of turning
into an intelligence collection depot that is used only to disseminate intelligence but
has no analytical competence. On the other hand, administratively-geared FIUs
appear to be more trusted by financial institutions as these are more likely to disclose
information to a “neutral, technical, and specialized interlocutor” ([15], p. 11).
Differences in organisational forms of FIUs may hinder the exchange of
information across borders. A report by the European Commission [4] highlights
that such problems have indeed emerged: at some points FIUs of law enforcement
type in certain Member States were only able to cooperate with similarly placed law
enforcement counterparts.
14 http://www.fincen.gov/int_fius.html
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However, as a result of further legislative developments, particularly following
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, an increasing number of countries have
introduced measures that allow their respective FIUs to share information with other
FIUs, even if they are of a different type [15]. In some instances problems relating to
information sharing have been overcome through memorandums of understanding
(MOU). The MOU has been designed by Egmont Group as a set of principles for
information exchange based on reciprocity and only for the purposes of analysis at
FIU level, with no further use allowed without the prior consent of the FIU that
provided the information.
Clearly the drive for intelligence and the need to address the money-laundering
phenomenon on a global scale requires effective cooperation between the various
FIUs. However, the fact that FIUs differ in their organisational form may imply that
countries address problems relating to money laundering in different ways. In order
to prevent such lack of global consistency policy makers have sought to introduce a
range of international requirements. These requirements were promoted and
enforced through the aforementioned FATF recommendations (including subsequent
revisions and interpretative notes), the 1990 Council of Europe Convention, the
1991 EU Council Directive (91/308/EEC) and its subsequent amendments
(Second Directive of 200115 and Third Directive of 200516). The issues that arise
from some of these requirements, specifically those envisaged by the Third
Directive, and how they affect the reporting system, are discussed in the following
section.17
Strengthening strategy
Extending the outreach of anti-money laundering measures
Over the years changes in the strategy for the war against money laundering have led
to the broadening of the scope of FIU-work and expanding the outreach of anti-
money laundering measures. Whereas originally money laundering was associated
primarily with illicit drug trade, the list of predicate crimes came to include
practically all types of crimes-for-profit18 (with some exceptions in various
countries).
Additionally, the group of entities obliged to report suspicious transactions
significantly expanded over the years to include not just classical financial service
15 2001/97/EC
16 2005/60/EC
17 Although the EU Directive applies specifically to EU Member States, other countries where similar
regulations have been introduced face similar challenges as those arising from the EU Directive.
18 The 1990 Council of Europe Convention expanded the definition of money laundering beyond that laid
down by the 1988 UN Convention, which defined laundering in association with drug-related offences
only. The Council of Europe Convention describes the underlying criminal activity that generates the
money subject to subsequent laundering as a “predicate offence” (see [12], for an account of international
legislative developments).
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institutions, but also casinos, brokerage and securities firms, lawyers, notaries,
auditors, real estate agents and so on.19
These changes have resulted in the extension of the outreach of anti-money
laundering measures, which policy makers believe will help prevent the corruption
of the financial system; and this has itself been underpinned by the broad
definition of money laundering. At the outset of the fight against money laundering
the concept of money laundering was broadened to include practically every act
that is subsequent to profit-seeking crime [7, 30]. By overstretching the meaning of
money laundering, to cover the movement and concealment of crime money, policy
makers have effectively created a tool for gathering intelligence about predicate
crimes [13]. The issue is whether this tool is being used efficiently considering the
lack of precise criteria for discerning tainted money and suspicious or unusual
transactions, in addition to the lack of consistent feedback from FIUs to reporting
institutions.
Indeed government agencies, often jointly with industry associations, seek to
provide guidance20 (in the form of handbooks and typologies) to reporting
institutions. However, in some cases this guidance remains broad, and, in certain
respects, impractical. Staff within reporting institutions are expected to competently
interpret relevant guidelines and be on the alert at all times.
Authorities and industry organisations in the UK have been particularly proactive
in providing advice and guidance to the industry on matters relating to anti-money
laundering control. In 2006 the UK Joint Money Laundering Steering Group
(JMLSG)21 produced a comprehensive guidance manual (updated in 2007)22 that
provides examples of high-risk customers and suspicious transactions. Examples
include: corporate customers with complex business ownership structures; politically
exposed persons; customers based in or doing business in high-risk jurisdictions;
customers engaged in cash-intensive businesses; the use of non-resident companies
in circumstances where the customer’s needs do not appear to support such
economic requirements; transfers to and from high-risk jurisdictions without
reasonable explanation; and unusual investment transactions without an apparently
discernible profitable motive. Examples of transactions that could trigger suspicion
19 Following the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 the US government introduced a number of
additional federal statutes and regulations that significantly expanded the list of reporting institutions and
ensured that certain groups of organisations outside the banking system were also subject to formal
reporting requirements. For instance, the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 imposed more rigid
reporting requirements on non-banking financial institutions (e.g. brokerage companies, some tribal
casinos etc), which prior to that point had been largely unregulated. Gradually, the US approach to
extending the list of reporting institutions was adopted globally.
20 The FATF, the Basel Committee and other international bodies have also issued guidance at various
points on know-your-customer rules and risk management.
21 An industry organisation (comprising a number of financial sector trade bodies) engaged in providing
advisory services on compliance with legal and regulatory requirements and good practice.
22 An updated version of this manual was issued in December 2007. The guidance was issued in two
parts: a) Guidance for the UK Financial Sector, Part I, b) Guidance for the UK Financial Sector, Part II:
Sectoral Guidance (Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, December 2007; available on the JMLSG
website – http://www.jmlsg.org.uk).
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in relation to terrorism include frequent international ATM23 (cash machine) activity.
The authors of this guidance manual have endeavoured to compile a methodical set
of requirements and, more importantly, instructions on how to implement them.
However, although these examples may be useful as general guidance, some of
them remain vague: for instance, almost any customer from Eastern Europe, Russia
or the Middle East could be regarded as a potential risk factor, irrespective of the
type of transactions they undertake.24 The risk of money laundering is in itself an
unclear concept. Does it relate only to a specific transaction (as more commonly
understood) or generally to a customer and his/her activities? The manual
interchangeably refers to (a) knowledge or suspicion that a transaction might
involve money laundering; and (b) knowledge or suspicion that a customer might be
involved in money laundering, which is not quite the same thing. Furthermore,
money laundering is such a broad concept that even marginal irregularity may
trigger suspicion, and suspicion prompts reporting to the relevant FIU. Suspicion,
however, is also a malleable term, a variable that depends on different mindsets,
subjective judgement and interpretation. The JMLSG admits that suspicion is indeed
subjective and “falls short of proof based on firm evidence” ([16], p. 121). JMLSG’s
handbook notes that UK courts have defined ‘suspicion’ as something beyond mere
speculation, and based on some foundation, for example: “A degree of satisfaction
and not necessarily amounting to belief but at least extending beyond speculation as
to whether an event has occurred or not”; and “Although the creation of suspicion
requires a lesser factual basis than the creation of a belief, it must nonetheless be
built upon some foundation” (p. 121). On its website the UK Serious Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA), which incorporates the UK FIU, refers to R v Da Silva
[2006] All ER (D) 131 (Jul) in which the Court decided that suspicion would arise
when: “there was a possibility which was more than fanciful, that the relevant facts
existed. This is subject in an appropriate case, to the further requirement that the
suspicion so formed should be of a settled nature.”25 Although the clarification
provided by JMLSG and SOCA is helpful, it remains broad and leaves scope for
interpretation.
The JMLSG insists that firms should encourage their staff to “think risk” ([16], p. 9)
in appealing to basic human virtues such as common sense, intelligence and
motivation. However, while the commitment and care of individual staff members are
of significant importance, the demand and need for ‘quality intelligence’ also requires
a clear basis for developing shared standards that ensures optimal objectivity and
consistency in decision-making.
Additionally, although UK authorities have indeed actively assisted the industry
by providing advice and detailed guidance, ensuring consistency of approach and the
23 Automated teller machine
24 As an example of poor practice and lack of a “robust approach to classifying the money laundering risk
associated” with clients, the UK’s financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), drew
attention to a wholesale small firm that classified all of its clients as low or medium risk even though most
of them were based in Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East ([10], p.12).
25 SOCA notes that in K Limited v National Westminster Bank plc (HMRC and SOCA intervening)
[2006] All ER (D) 131 (Jul) the Court has decided that this definition should apply in both criminal and
civil cases. See http://www.soca.gov.uk/financialIntel/faqs.html.
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enforcement of respective national regulations throughout various countries remains
a pressing issue.
Expanding target to include financing of terrorism
After the events of 11 September 2001 the criteria for reporting suspicious
transactions have been expanded to include transactions that may be linked to
terrorist financing. The Third Directive places particular emphasis on this issue. This
means that reporting institutions are now obliged to keep a look out for clean money
that may serve terrorists in addition to potentially dirty money.26 However, it is not
quite clear how reporting institutions are supposed to be able to identify such risks.
The situation varies across countries, but in general terms little or no specific
guidance has been given as to how to determine whether or not a customer or a
partner may be linked to or involved in terrorist financing. Is running the names of
clients through databases of national and international blacklists and sanctions lists
sufficient? Should banks and other reporting institutions watch out for connections
to ‘countries of risk’? For instance, if a European bank is conducting a due
diligence27 exercise on a potential client in Ukraine, should the bank also seek to
understand whether their Ukrainian client has ever done business in any of the
countries that may be deemed as ‘risky’, e.g. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya? If such
links exist, should the reporting institution be concerned and should they notify the
relevant FIU? It seems that the approach to be adopted in this matter is largely to be
defined by the reporting institutions themselves on a discretionary basis. Due to the lack
of clearer guidance and criteria for discerning suspicious activity (both with regard to
suspicion of money laundering and terrorist financing), particular ethnic or national
groups could potentially become targets of systemic suspicion and scrutiny (see [13]). If
the reporting institutions had clearer guidance on this matter, they could prove a useful
source of targeted intelligence. The Directive does indeed require Member States to
provide access to up-to-date information on the practices of money launderers and
terrorist financers and on indicators leading to the identification of suspicious
transactions (Article 35.2). The question remains, however, how clear these indicators
are and how consistently they are applied across various sectors and countries.
Politically exposed persons
Additional challenges for reporting institutions and the authorities exercising anti-
money laundering control may arise from the implementation of the requirement of
the Third EU Directive in relation to the identification of Politically Exposed
26 For instance, in some circumstances charities can be used as a front for (or vehicle of) terrorist
financing: banks that carry out financial transactions involving or on behalf of charities may find
themselves in a situation which necessitates that they report to the relevant FIU; however, banks may
overlook important underlying risks due to the lack of sufficient and clear guidance in existing regulations.
27 The term ‘due diligence’ is generally understood as the use of procedures aimed at verifying the identity
of a customer or a potential business partner. The meaning of the term, however, has gradually been
broadened to denote a process of enhanced due diligence meaning examining the background, integrity,
sources of wealth, extent of political exposure, and so on, of a customer, a potential business partner or an
investment target.
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Persons or PEPs. Once again reporting institutions are expected to be the source of
intelligence that the authorities would otherwise have difficulties in gathering.
Background checks aimed at identifying PEPs appear to be a good way of gathering
intelligence about potential tax evasion and white-collar crime.
According to the Directive (Article 3 (8)), PEPs are “natural persons who are or
have been entrusted with prominent public functions and immediate family
members, or persons known to be close associates, of such persons” (Official
Journal of the European Union, 25.11.2005, p. 22). The Directive stipulates the
necessity of “enhanced due diligence”, or, in other words, “rigorous customer
identification and verification procedures”, in cases of non-domestic PEPs, i.e.
individuals who hold or have held “important public positions” in another Member
State or a third country, particularly in countries where corruption is endemic. With
regard to domestic PEPs, reporting institutions are advised to apply “complete
normal customer due diligence measures” (or “simplified due diligence”,28 for
instance, with regard to customers entrusted with public functions in accordance
with the Treaty on European Union). However, it is not explicitly clear whether
identity verification on its own is satisfactory in meeting the requirement for
“complete normal customer due diligence” or whether it should be combined with
other measures.29 Article 8 of the Third Directive stipulates that customer due
diligence measures comprise the following: identifying the customer and verifying
his/her identity on the basis of information from a reliable and independent source;
obtaining information on the purpose and nature of any given business relationship;
monitoring of business relationships, including, where necessary, source of funds.
Article 13 defines enhanced customer due diligence as the measures listed in Article
8 in addition to measures that include establishing the source of wealth of non-
domestic PEPs and/or gathering information on the reputation of respondent
institutions and assessing their anti-money laundering control systems. If the
prescribed “complete normal customer due diligence measures” implies the necessity
of establishing and verifying the identity of any given customer, it remains unclear
how far beyond that point reporting institutions should go in applying “enhanced
due diligence measures”. The scope of due diligence work undertaken with regard to
non-domestic PEPs is, therefore, to be decided by individual reporting institutions.
28 The Directive appears to distinguish three levels of due diligence: 1) standard or normal customer due
diligence which includes identity verification and understanding of the nature of the customer’s business;
2) enhanced due diligence in situations of heightened risk where additional information should be
gathered; 3) simplified customer due diligence where the situation does not necessitate identity
verification. In the latter case, the Directive envisages that by way of derogation Member States may
allow reporting institutions not to apply customer due diligence procedures in certain situations, for
instance in the case of listed companies in Member States or clients with life insurance policies where the
annual premium is no more than € 1.000 (in any event, reporting institutions need to gather sufficient
information to establish whether the customer qualifies for an exemption). From the text of the Directive
(Article 7) it also appears that occasional transactions amounting to less than € 15.000, that are not
associated with any knowledge or suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, may also in certain
situations be subject to simplified know-your-customer rules.
29 The aforementioned JMLSG manual contains a checklist for standard evidence that should be obtained
by the reporting institutions with regard to various types of customers. However, as mentioned elsewhere,
although authorities in the UK have endeavoured to provide detailed guidance to the industry, ensuring
consistency of approach throughout various countries remains an unresolved issue.
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In addition to this, the precise meaning of “important public positions” and
“prominent public functions” also remains ambiguous. Furthermore, it may prove
difficult in establishing whether a customer is an immediate family member or a
close associate of a PEP unless the customer explicitly declares that such a
relationship exists.
In an attempt to clarify these issues, the European Commission has issued a set of
implementing measures30 according to which only public functions exercised by a
customer at a national level are regarded as “prominent”. It is further stipulated that
where the extent of political exposure at lower (i.e. local) levels is comparable to
similar positions at the national level, it is at the discretion of the reporting
institutions to decide, depending on the level of risk (on a “risk-sensitive basis”, a
concept discussed in an another section of this paper), whether or not these
individuals should be regarded as PEPs. It appears that this guidance rests on the
assumption that reporting institutions have some prior knowledge of existing
political structures in the country of origin of their customer(s), which is not
necessarily always the case. In an effort to provide guidance to reporting institutions
the European Commission has provided31 an instructive checklist for PEP figures;
and it has also indicated that middle ranking and junior officials are to be excluded
from the PEP category. This may well have made things slightly easier but not
significantly clearer. If the purpose of identifying PEPs is to become aware of the
possibility that they may become involved in corrupt practices — i.e. that they
represent a laundering-risk factor — it is not clear why junior or regional level
public posts are excluded from the PEP category. Perhaps it is assumed that the more
central the role of the PEP in national politics, the larger the scope of potential
corruption and reputational risk associated with the PEP’s role. This, however, is not
necessarily always the case.
Furthermore according to the EU Directive, risk is generally higher in countries
where corruption is widespread. Once again the European Commission assumes that
reporting institutions have existing knowledge about the political environment in the
countries of residence of their customers. However, in order to be able to identify
countries of heightened risk, reporting institutions are likely to rely on external
criteria and surveys such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index and/or reports produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and these may not
necessarily suffice as supplementary material for their specific purposes. According
to Séverine Anciberro, a representative of the European Banking Federation, the EU
should be considered a single jurisdiction and PEPs from EU Member States should
be regarded as domestic PEPs because credit institutions in Member States are
already implementing relevant due diligence procedures [1]. Anciberro notes that the
banks in Europe would have preferred if PEPs were regarded as a risk factor only in
cases where transactions were particularly substantial or complex in nature, thereby
30 COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2006/70/EC of 1 August 2006 “laying down implementing measures for
the Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition of
‘politically exposed person’ and the technical criteria for simplified customer due diligence procedures and
for exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on an occasional or very limited basis”
(Official Journal of the European Union L 214/29 – L 214/34, 4.8.2006).
31 COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2006/70/EC
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posing enhanced money laundering and reputational risks. Such an approach would
necessitate the undertaking of enhanced due diligence investigations only in
circumstances where PEPs appear to have engaged in potentially suspicious
transactions. The Federation’s proposal, however, was not adopted.
The EU Directive presents further challenges. If a reporting institution is aware
that a customer is a PEP residing in another country, clearly the institution in
question will be obliged to undertake, on a risk-sensitive basis, an enhanced due
diligence investigation into the integrity and background of this customer. But what
happens if the institution is not immediately aware of particular public or prominent
roles occupied by their customer? Article 13.4(a) of the Third Directive states that
“in respect of transactions or business relationships with politically exposed persons
residing in another Member State or a third country, Member States shall require
those institutions and persons covered by this Directive to: (a) have appropriate risk-
based procedures to determine whether the customer is a politically exposed person
[. . .]” (Official Journal of the European Union, 25.11.2005, p. 25). This provision
leaves scope for interpretation to the extent that reporting institutions will be obliged
to run checks on any customer(s)32 residing in other Member States or third
countries to determine whether they are in fact PEPs. This means that standard or
“complete normal” due diligence measures undertaken on customers living in
another country could probably never be completely adequate. Even in situations
where reporting institutions are well acquainted with the political environment of a
specific country, and the associated risks, establishing the identity of the customer
would not be sufficient in establishing whether or not the customer is also a PEP. In
such circumstances there are two possible options: (a) the customer would have to
either declare any public positions held or (b) additional research would be
undertaken by the reporting institution into the profile of the subject. This means that
in order to identify whether a customer is a PEP, the reporting institution is obliged
to conduct enhanced due diligence. The same applies to close associates of PEPs.33
However, the implementing measures directive (Commission Directive 2006/70/EC)
states that the requirement of institutions to identify close associates of PEPs (in
accordance with Directive 2005/60/EC) applies to the extent that the relation
between the PEP and their associate is publicly known or that the institution has
reasons to believe that such relation exists. The European Commission further notes
that this does not presuppose active research. Yet if a customer from Nigeria applies
for an investment loan in London, bank officers are not necessarily aware of the
public role, if any, of the customer in Nigeria or whether the subject is a close
associate of a high ranking political official. It is clear that in such cases establishing
32 Except for situations where, as envisaged by the EU Directive, simplified-know-your-customer rules
(explained earlier) may be applied.
33 Article 2, paragraph 3 of the implementing measures directive (Directive 2006/70/EC) stipulates that
‘persons known to be close associates’ shall include: a) any natural person who is known to have joint
beneficial ownership of legal entities or legal arrangements, or any other close business relations, with a
PEP; b) any natural person who has sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal arrangement which
is known to have been set up for the benefit of a PEP. Thus formulated, this article leaves scope for
interpretation to the extent that the category of associates of PEPs can also include other groups of
individuals who are linked to PEPs.
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the identity of the customer is not sufficient and that more in-depth background
checks would have to be undertaken.
Furthermore, with regard to PEPs in other Member States or third countries,
Article 13 of the Third Directive requires reporting institutions to take adequate
measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds involved in any given
business relationship or transaction. In practice this translates into, first, establishing
whether or not a customer is a PEP; and, second, undertaking further research in
order to ascertain the legitimate origin of the PEP’s funds, which is something that
even the police and tax authorities may have difficulty ascertaining.
Article 13 of the Directive states that enhanced customer due diligence measures
must be applied in situations which by their nature can present a higher risk of
money laundering or terrorist financing. Reporting institutions should regard
relationships with PEPs from other countries as a higher risk factor in any case,
although the precise definition of ‘higher risk’, and the scope of the relevant
enhanced due diligence checks, are to be determined by individual reporting
institutions.
It should be noted that for a number of years, preceding the introduction of the
Third Directive, due diligence checks have often been aimed at establishing whether
an individual might be politically exposed or linked to organised crime. In many
cases, particularly in Europe, this has been done as a matter of good risk
management practice and not necessarily in a bid to comply with specific
regulations. The concept of political exposure implies a range of risks, which are
not limited to potential involvement in corruption and/or money laundering, and also
include political and other, ultimately reputational, risks. The reputation or business
standing of an individual or a business may be harmed as a result of political
confrontation, for instance. This point is particularly valid in terms of emerging
markets where business and politics remain closely intertwined. The extent of such
political exposure and the associated risks does not solely depend on whether an
individual holds a public position of authority. Political exposure may additionally
arise from party affiliations or business associations.
Such assessments undoubtedly require proactive research and enhanced due
diligence measures. According to a study undertaken by KPMG in 2007, in 2004
45% of banks reported that they had special procedures in place for identifying and
monitoring PEPs, whereas in 2007 the figure increased to 71%. In the US, however,
nearly all banks introduced such procedures in compliance with the U.S.A.
PATRIOT Act of 2001. KPMG’s study also notes that banks are increasingly using
independent due diligence providers to verify the identity of their clients [17].
However, the due diligence industry now appears to be driven more by legislation
rather than by a desire for sound risk management practices. Furthermore, it is difficult
to discern whether some institutions are conducting work diligently or whether
research is being taken to excessive extremes as there is a definite lack of consistency.
Of more importance: there is no effective evaluation of due diligence procedures
across economic sectors and jurisdictions (even within the European Union).
Due to the general fuzziness of criteria and guidelines for due diligence reporting,
FIUs and their regulatory partners are unlikely to be receiving the quality
intelligence from reporting institutions that they expect. This is true, for instance,
in terms of due diligence investigations in investment and private banking where the
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risk of money laundering can be relatively high. Almost any customer from an
emerging market associated with/or a PEP34 can be regarded as a potential money
launderer. Nevertheless, in the absence of clearer criteria, it seems that financial and
non-financial service providers alike are happy to work with PEPs and their associates
as long as these are wealthy individuals and do not look like outright criminals.
Whether or not these subjects have a controversial reputation is a subjective point.
This is only directly relevant to reporting institutions in so far as to ensure that they do
not incur financial losses either as a result of reputational damage or penalties.
Banks certainly need to be aware of the potential transaction risks, political risks,
reputational risks and so on that may be associated with a specific customer. Yet it is
not explicitly clear whether and when an existing risk, specifically money
laundering/terrorist financing risks (which also fall into the category of reputational
risks), becomes a deal-breaker and, more importantly, a reason for reporting to the
relevant FIU. The fact that a potential risk exists does not mean per se that the
transaction is suspicious or that the customer is a money launderer. It is difficult to
make judgements and to strike balances. It is often the case that even within one
single institution different departments view risks in different ways. While
compliance departments anxiously seek to identify potential areas of reputational
concern associated with their clients, officers on the banking or marketing side
sometimes tend to be less concerned about reputational issues or else view them as
unsubstantiated. And to an extent they have a point especially because it is often
difficult to verify or prove reputational concerns, particularly when they are based on
rumours. Should a transaction be reported by a compliance officer to the relevant
FIU in instances where due diligence checks have uncovered integrity suspicions
based on rumours only? A bank may decide not to proceed with a specific deal
because of rumour-related concerns but it is not explicitly clear whether that
information should be fed into the general flow of intelligence to the relevant
authorities. Presumably there would be no need to file a report if the reasons for
concern were regarded as mere speculation. But, again, there is scope for
interpretation on this point.
34 The implementing measures directive (2006/70/EC) clarifies that after an individual has ceased to
exercise a prominent public function, subject to a minimum period, this individual is no longer to be
regarded as a PEP (point 5 of the introduction). The directive further stipulates that “without prejudice to
the application, on a risk-sensitive basis, of enhanced due diligence measures, where a person has ceased
to be entrusted with a prominent public function [. . .] for a period of at least one year, institutions [. . .]
shall not be obliged to consider such a person as politically exposed” (Article 2, paragraph 4, p.32).
However, this can be interpreted to the extent that in certain circumstances, on a risk-sensitive basis, some
individuals should be regarded as PEPs even after a year has elapsed since ceasing to hold a prominent
public function. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, in emerging markets politics and business are not
completely divorced. Successful businessmen, including former politicians that have embarked on
developing careers in private business, often forge some sort of a business arrangement with current
politicians, i.e. PEPs, in order to ensure support for their own interests. This suggests that former
politicians and/or legislators turned businessmen are also to be regarded as PEPs in certain circumstances
on a risk-sensitive basis.
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The general practice shows that, albeit somewhat ironically, over the years
criminal or tainted money has undergone a process of evolutionary cleansing and
purification. A majority of today’s tycoons, including those known and less well-
known wealthy businessmen from former Socialist countries, made their fortunes
in the early years of market reform and economic liberalisation when business
practices were highly questionable, if not outright criminal. Yet these very same
businessmen, many of whom later became categorised as PEP(s), are now
transforming the reputations of their businesses and demanding to be viewed as
legitimate players. The growth of business requires new forms of business
relationships, with lenders, co-investors, IPO35 underwriters and advisors, which
inevitably leads to higher public exposure, hence the need for more transparency.
As Savona [28] notes, criminal organisations need to “develop an aura of
respectability” (p. 8) and legitimise themselves if they want to ensure the
unfettered circulation of their capital. Such evolutionary processes have taken
place not just in the former Socialist bloc but also in other parts of the world,
including the USA [28].
The important question is whether the wealth of newly defined ‘legitimate’
businessmen, including in some instances PEPs or those formerly involved in
questionable activities, is still in some way tainted. But this remains a question with
an unclear answer and a wide array of implications, including moral, economic and
legal.
Relationships between financial and other reporting institutions with non-
domestic PEPs remains a sensitive issue that can have legal consequences not
simply under anti-money laundering regulations but also under the US Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),36 where there is involvement of US institutions. For
US institutions that hold potentially guilty knowledge of questionable business
practices involving PEPs possible implications include penalties and reputational
damage.
The existing anti-money laundering control procedures are designed in a way
that inevitably provokes fear of penalties and reputational damage. However, this
fear does not automatically mean that reporting institutions will provide higher
quality intelligence to the authorities in a consistent and methodical way, because
the system is largely based on vague concepts and subjective assessments. Extra-
systemic and unforeseen procedures including whistle blowing, for instance, can
prove effective in correcting misconduct by reporting institutions, such as, for
instance, the concealment of culpable knowledge of factors of suspicion by
35 Initial Public Offering or the flotation of a private company on a stock market, i.e. a company’s first
offering of shares to the public.
36 The FCPA was enacted in 1977. Gradually other countries followed suit and introduced similar
regulations. In 1997 the OECD adopted its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, which came into force in 1999.
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reporting institutions. But even such instances do not ensure the necessary flow
of useful intelligence.
Beneficial owners and correspondent banking relationships
Another challenge posed by the Third Directive arises from the requirement to
identify beneficial owners, i.e. the individual wielding ultimate control over the
customer and/or the individual or entity on whose behalf a transaction is conducted.
The Directive defines beneficial owners as holding 25% or more of the shares in a
business. Good risk management and reputational checks practices conform to this
requirement in any event but in some cases it might be impossible to identify the
ultimate owner. European banks have expressed their concern that banks do not
always have access to trustworthy sources of information that would allow such
identification [1].
Banks have also stressed that another challenge posed by the Directive is the
requirement that they do not engage in correspondent relationships with banks
known for allowing their accounts to be used by a shell bank(s). In this respect
Anciberro [1] notes that the obligation to know the customer’s customer is generally
not workable.
The Directive lays down these requirements without providing any practical
guidance as to how they are to be implemented. It appears that in both cases — the
identification of beneficial owners and verification of correspondent relationships —
reporting institutions would need to implement enhanced due diligence procedures
but, once again, the scope of these must be determined by individual reporting
institutions. More often than not banks and other reporting institutions resort to using
the services of independent due diligence providers to ascertain the true ownership
of a company/establish whether a correspondent bank is engaged in relationships
with obscure banks. The key question is at what point and under what circumstances
does the gathered information become useful intelligence for regulators.
Risk-based approach: another ambiguous concept?
The central message of the Third Directive is two-fold in its call for a) enhanced
customer due diligence in all situations where there is a higher risk of money
laundering and/or terrorist financing; and b) the implementation of adequate
measures to compensate for the higher level of risk in situations in which the
customer has not been physically present for identification purposes. An
important amendment introduced by the Third Directive affecting the anti-money
laundering control system is the introduction of a risk-based approach. The
Directive asserts that enhanced due diligence will be applied on “a risk-sensitive
basis”. This means that reporting institutions can decide for themselves when and
in what circumstances to undertake in-depth due diligence checks. To this end,
reporting institutions should have clear direction and criteria on deciding which
customers are “high-risk”. Having said that, on the basis of the Directive it
appears that non-domestic PEPs and their sources of wealth, as well as
correspondent banking relationships with respondent institutions from third
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countries, should always be subject to enhanced due diligence regardless of
whether reporting entities consider them ‘low-risk’ or ‘high-risk’. The most
important thing to remember, within the remits of the risk-based approach, is that
reporting institutions should know precisely whom they are dealing with (e.g. to
know the customer’s identity, nature of business, place of employment and
sources of funds, and so on), and, depending on the level of risk, decide the
scope of due diligence for themselves.
On the whole the banking industry has welcomed the introduction of the risk-
based approach as prescribed in the Third Directive [1]. In fact, the European
Commission [3] has admitted that even prior to the introduction of the Third
Directive many institutions had been applying a risk-based approach in non-face to
face identification procedures. The risk-based approach helps to better focus
resources besides circumventing the occurrence of costs that are not commensurate
with actual risks.
The risk-based approach is fast becoming increasingly important in the USA
as well. According to FinCEN’s director, James Freis, “matching risk-based
examination to risk-based obligations” would help achieve regulatory efficiency.
Freis admits that a risk-based reduction in covered entities would lead to a more
efficient concentration of examination resources [11].
It appears that prior to the introduction of the Third Directive (and similar
regulations in countries outside the EU) nearly all changes in the strategy of the
anti-money laundering war have led to over-regulation and over-compliance
without achieving any evident success in the reduction of purported money
laundering activities. Tables 1 and 2 (below) clearly show that the overall number
of suspicious transactions reports submitted to the FIUs of several countries has
increased over the years, specifically since 1994 (in some instances peaking in
2002 following the terrorist attacks of 2001). According to Scott McClain, Deputy
General Counsel to the Financial Service Centers of America, money service
businesses (MSBs) bear the cost of the US BSA enforcement strategy. He further
adds that compliance with SAR37 and CTR38 requirements in the US has led to
direct and substantial costs not just in the MSB industry but also across the whole
financial services sector. These costs in turn have resulted into a pressure to
increase fees charged to customers. McClain makes the point that existing
regulatory pressures and the lack of clear guidance have ultimately led to a large
number of defensive SAR filings as well as duplicative CTR filings. The level of
suspicious transaction reports, according to McClain, clearly places a burden on
government agencies, specifically FinCEN, which processes a large amount of data
of “dubious value” as a result. In particular, McClain points out that the increase in
regulatory scrutiny following the events of 11 September 2001 has led to defensive
SAR filings that report even marginally irregular activity [22].
37 Acronym for “Suspicious activity report”
38 Acronym for “Currency transaction report”
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As these tables illustrate, the number of suspicious transaction reports has
increased over the years. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the quality
of reports has improved. Policy makers hope that the risk-based approach will help
reduce the number of poor quality reports and improve the quality of intelligence
provided to FIUs. Nevertheless, the question of how to identify risks remains.
Ambiguous terminology and the lack of systematic feedback from the authorities
and FIUs to the reporting institutions are the main setbacks in the process of
intelligence gathering. In the absence of clearer criteria, risk assessment appears to
be largely based on the hunches, and in some cases tenacity, of individual
researchers. Moreover, within the remits of a risk-based approach there exists a
‘reverse risk’: the risk of being wrong or, in statistical terms, the possibility of false
positive and false negative errors. Risk-based decision-making in the absence of
solid and precise definitions can be indeed a risky undertaking in itself.
Table 2 Number of suspicious activity report filings by year in the USA
Institution 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Depository Institution 62.388 81.197 96.521 120.505 162.720 203.538
Money Services Business - - - - - -
Casinos and Card Clubs 85 45 557 436 464 1.377
Securities & Futures Industries - - - - - -
Subtotal 62.473 81.242 97.078 120.941 163.184 204.915
Institution 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Depository Institution 273.823 288.343 381.671 522.655 567.080
Money Services Business 5.723 209.512 296.284 383.567 496.400
Casinos and Card Clubs 1.827 5.095 5.754 6.072 7.285
Securities & Futures Industries - 4.267 5.705 6.936 8.129
Subtotal 281.373 507.217 689.414 919.230 1.078.894
Source: FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review — By the Numbers (Issue 9, January 2008)
Table 1 Number of suspicious activity report filings by year in some European countries
State 1994 1995 1996 1997 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Belgium 2.183 3.926 5.771 7.747 13.120 9.953 11.234 10.148 9.938
Germanyb 3.282 2.935 3.289 8.261 6.602 8.062 8.241 10.051
France 684 866 902 1.213 8.719 9.019 10.842 11.553 12.047
Netherlands 14.753 15.007 16.087 17.000 137.339 177.157 174.835 181.623 -
-unusual 3.546 2.994 2.572 24.741 37.748 41.003 38.481
-suspicious
United Kingdom 15.007 13.170 16.125 14.148 56.023a 94.718a 154.536a 195.702 213.561
All figures in this paper are in Continental European annotation.
Source for figures relating to years 1994 to 1997: European Commission [4]
Source for figures relating to years 2002 to 2006: FIU’s Annual Report(s)
a Source: [8]
b The 2004 annual report of Bundeskriminalamt, Germany’s FIU, provides the following figures: 1994 —
2.873, 1995 — 2.759, 1996 — 3.019, 1997 — 3.137.
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The new turn in strategy — with the introduction of a risk-based approach to due
diligence and intelligence gathering — may well prove critical in pre-empting
unnecessary, ineffective and costly work. However, it is also an admission that anti-
money laundering policies have been flawed somewhere along the line. Yet policy
makers insist that the new change of tactic and strategy will result in victory. We
have heard that before.
Conclusion: can we learn lessons from the past, at last, or will we revert
to the old practices?
What is increasingly important now is for FIUs and other law enforcement agencies
to create a more efficient way of feeding information back to reporting institutions.
Otherwise the long awaited victory against money laundering will remain a fanciful
and distant aim. Besides, perhaps it is time to start thinking about money laundering
as the Achilles heel of criminal activity by which offenders can be identified. On the
basis of reports on suspicious money laundering transactions FIUs can actually
identify leads to predicate crimes. However, this can only be ensured by a system
that is well designed and equipped to spot such transactions, as reporting institutions
cannot be expected to act as spies or detectives. The system as it stands now is far
from ideal. One can only speculate as to how much of the information that reporting
institutions gather on their customers is actually used by FIUs. There are massive
flows of reports about suspicious transactions, but how many of these are of good
quality remains an issue. In addition, in the absence of proper definitions of
‘suspicion’ and ‘risk’, it is likely that substantial amounts of quality intelligence
remains in-house and is never passed onto the relevant FIUs.
The introduction of the risk-based approach may prove a sensible move, provided
that reporting institutions will receive systematic feedback from the respective FIU
and clearer guidance on how to determine risk factors and how far they should go in
their efforts to gather intelligence on their customers. It is also unclear what the
implications of the risk-based approach would be if a PEP or another risk factor slips
through the system. Should banks be held accountable for such failures?39 It would
be difficult to criticise a compliance officer for making an erroneous judgment when
there is little consistency in defining ‘suspicion’. In fact, it may be difficult to prove
in a criminal context that a banker had doubts about a transaction but chose to ignore
it [20]. Of course, law enforcement authorities may always find a reason to impose a
penalty but such punitive actions do not necessarily result in quality intelligence. In
fact, this can again lead to over-compliance in the form of over-reporting, which is
precisely what the risk-based approach aims to prevent.
39 For instance, the JMLSG handbook, reviewed earlier, notes that the FSA is unlikely to take enforcement
action if a firm demonstrates that it has put in place an effective system of controls. But what essentially
“an effective system” means is unclear. The guide uses broad terms such as “reasonable care”, “reasonable
steps”, “appropriate steps”, “appropriate procedures” etc., which fall short of explicitly defining the
minimum prescribed standard that would guarantee defence against enforcement action.
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From the perspective of individual FIUs, the increasing number of reports does not
mean an improvement in quality. FIUs are unique ‘knowledge centres’ ([5], p. 67). They
gather knowledge from organisations that are largely profit-oriented, and therefore it
goes against the nature of these organisations to play detectives. In establishing an
optimal suspicion threshold it would be helpful, therefore, to develop basic prescribed
standards and automated knowledge-based systems, or artificial intelligence networks
[13], in order to minimise the margin of subjective judgement. Besides, it is important
to ensure that the guidance provided by the respective national authorities and the
enforcement of regulations are consistent across countries.
There is a need for further clarity in the use of terms, especially now with the
introduction of the risk-based approach. While risk is in itself a nebulous concept,
the consequences of a risk-based approach and, more importantly, of its failures, are
also unclear. Are the authorities being responsible enough by introducing a new
approach that is based on such a fragmented foundation? Risk factors such as money
laundering, corruption and terrorist financing remain highly nebulous for as long as
there are no clear indicators in terms of the basis on which to act in order to
minimise the risks of wrong decision-making and any resultant repercussions. The
potential implications of ill-informed decision-making, in addition to the omission of
vital information gathered, can range from reputational damage, which can result in
substantial financial losses, to regulatory reprimand and fines. Little attention has
been paid as to the practical side of how to strike a balance between the profit-
oriented nature of the reporting institutions, the need to keep the financial system
clean, and the fear of being punished by regulators. Until further clarity is achieved,
there is a chance that the risk-based approach may at any time slide back to over-
compliance as reporting institutions will wish to avoid the really feared risk of being
reprimanded by the regulatory authorities (see [14]).
Reporting institutions need to be better informed to understand the rationale
behind certain official requirements if they are to effectively apply a risk-based
approach. It may be a ‘war’, but although reporting institutions find themselves on
the frontline of this war, they do not necessarily make good soldiers, especially when
they have to fight in the fog. If the authorities want to ensure that FIUs (as
information processing units) receive quality intelligence they must define the
parameters of this intelligence and the precise circumstances that prompt reporting.
For the system to work properly the authorities and the respective national FIUs
must provide reporting institutions with regular feedback so that the latter can learn
how to better assist the FIUs. FIUs also require systematic feedback from the police
and prosecutors that would enable them to better focus their efforts. FIUs are obliged
to demonstrate that they too are accountable for their missives and their actions;
otherwise, like soldiers in the absence of clear commands, reporting institutions may
slide back to the old practice of reporting all or nothing, and there is a danger that
FIUs will fight the current ‘war’ on their own with no imminent success.
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